EXHIBIT NO. 103

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CEAG/ALD/Pb/ (474)

At Sun, Daces per 15, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Tu:

The Commander ENTERPRISE Air Group.

The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. EN.ERPRISE

Sublect:

Report of Action with Japanes Air Force

at Oahu, T.H., December 7, 1941.

deference: (a) Articles 712 and 874, U.S.N. Regulations.

At U615 December 7, 1941 I took off from ENTERPRISE, whose position at that time was approximately 215 miles due west of Oahu, with a mission of searching a sector U58*-095° true for a distance of 150 miles, and then to proceed to Ford Island. Ensign P. L. Teaff, USN in airplane t-S-2 accompanied me. ky passenger was Lieut-Comdr. Browfield Nichol, USN, Tactical Officer attached to the staff of Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, who had been ordered to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet inmediately after my arrival at Ford Island.

At about 0720 I signted a tanker to starboard. proved to be the "PAT DOHENY" of Los Angeles, belonging to the Richfield Oil Co. Continuing on my track of O90° I sighted and passed the U+S.S. THÆSHER accompanied by the U.S.S. LITCHFIELD at about 0740. At about 0810 I passed Kagna Point abea... to port distance 20 miles. At 0820 passod Barber's Point to seaward and at this time I noticed approximately a squadron of planes circling Ewa Field in column. Bolioving them to be U. S. Army pursuit planes I gave them a wide borth, decreasing my altitude to about 800 foot and continued toward Ford Island Field. At a point mid-way between Swa Field and Ford Island I noticed considerable "AA" fire ahond. At almost the same instant I was attacked by Japanese planes from the rear without warning. Recognizing the insignia of one plane that had completed a dive on me -I immediately dove toward the ground zig-zagging. Ly passenger did not have sufficient time to man the free gunby fixed guns were loaded and charged but I had no opportunity to use them. The planes that attacked no appeared to be lowwing monoplane fighters with retractable landing gear. Ly wing man was attacked at the same time but was not hit and stayed with me, circling low over a cane field to the North of Pearl City. It was immediately evident that I was under fire regardless of which direction I went. I did not have sufficient fuel to return to the ship had I been able to get away from the island. Hoping that I would be recognized as friendly I decided to make a low approach to Ford Island Field ·

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istended i test accept in the it. In our constitution of the still inclined indicate and best distance in it. In the inclined in the inclination is with a crew or and to fact their mount is no frequency or down for loading. If we will not not another than the feri island Field control town. I get the details of the interval of the control town. I get the details of the interval of the control of the control

- Lt. Commander-in-Julef. Inclific Fleet. I informed but of the Journalder-in-Julef. Inclific Fleet. I informed but of the Estion of the ENVERFILDE and our mission.
- attac on the law, Yard which a peared to be in the vicinity of Ten-Ten dock that the dry-dock. The attacking lanes cake in down-sun making shallow dives (about 45° 50°). The average release heighth being about 1000, lindus, in some cases releases were indeed as low as 300 000 feet, indicating that their boulds were asked the instinct their left the rack. Approximately 18 planes participated in this attack, following each other down from the same direction with a considerable longer interval between drops than is our custom. However the attack was well delivered and none of the clames were seen shot down furing their dive. After releasing, their evisive tactics were sound, keeping low and constantly enabling course. They were subjected to heavy "AA" fire during the average. Thise planes were of a pellowish silver color, low wing mone, lanes, with fixed landing mar and a peared to be sindlar to the litudishi "Marignes" km. II, as illustrated in "Jane's all the Worlds Afremati". The bound appeared to be 500 pound is, only criticism of this particular attack was that they the case in from the same direction instead of median a divided attack, nowever the ineffectiveness of our AA fire, thek of hir apposition and the sammer in anich the pressed their attacks home in this articular instance combined to make the attack position in this articular instance combined to make the
- I was then endered to report to Schumber Patrol The or Ford Island. Upon ascertaining the mamber of planes from the EMPARPHOSE Group that had landed satisfact this time (13 planes of VS-6 and VB-6) I was endered to send 9 planes out to search a section 330° 050° distance 175 mile, and the remaining planes to investigate reports of hostile surface puts and sup-page south of Barber's Point -

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and if found, to attack with souls and sunfire. I then obtained permission to station, self in the Ford Island Field Control Tower in order to be in direct communication with the planes and the ENTE PRISE as a Coast huard officer we the only officer detailed to duty there. Due to the low-lower of the transmitter in the tower I could at no time communicate with either. The lack of proper communication facilities, telephone in radio, were a contributory cause to the loss of 4 airplanes of VF-o, which were shot down by our own AA fire, during the night. I attempted to transmit landing instructions to them via the tower, but they were unable to here. It was necessary for them to land due to the lack of fuel. Two of the six landed safely. I then attempted to communicate with the ENTERPRISE via the tower voice set in order to recommend that no more planes be sent in to Ford Island, without success. I then learned that the remainder of the group that had been launched had returned to the ship.

- 5. Lack of information that hostilities had started with Japan, proper communications, the inability of our ground and shi board forces to recognize friendly planes, or know the proper recognition signals were the contributory causes for the loss of personnel and airplanes of the INTERPALSE Air Group.
- No planes were equipped with self scaling tanks or amor - all guns were fully armed.
- 7. The suddeness and magnitude of the enemy attack caused such a stunning effect upon ground and shi personnel that all aircraft were fired upon regardless of their being friendly. I was under fire until my wheels touched the ground on Ford Island some of the guns being not more than 50 yards distant from me. The importance of some means of positive identification of own airplanes, other than visual signals cannot be over emphasized. The loss of the four fighters of VF-6 that night is a good example of what happens unless proper communications and means of controlling and identifying aircraft in the air is available.
- 8. I then received orders to rejoin the ENTEAPHISE at sunrise the next morning with our remaining planes. Just prior to the time of our scheduled take-off, a utility plane (JRS) took off, and was immediately fired on by ships and other shore batteries. I had breviously arranged that every means available be taken to notify all hands of our scheduled

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departure in route to be train to the ENT of doc. It was necessary to bely the coff for much, one hour occase, of continuous many AA fire. At 00.5 the resistant ENTE doc Names took off, much with 1000 jound bombs and received to the sail without further incident.

all personal of this group conducted than selves in accordance with the night irreditions of the service and under the circumstances did all that the could possibly its.

10. List. 3. E. Dickenson, bon, Scotting Standron Sim, and marving been attacked by superfor numbers of Japanese Planes and under constant AA fire from the ground was forced to build out, his line heaving causat fire. In the maidst of the third attack on Pearl Harbor, we made his way to Ford Island Field and Landintely upon arrival there manned another plane and participated in the 175 mile search flight. At this time his ordeal of having been snot down was not known to his superiors and no mention of the same was made by him to anyone at the time, he thus displaying a sujerb courage, stanina, devotion to duty, unexcelled logic and coolness in action. It is requested that this officer be given an official commendation for the performance of duty.

H. L. YULIG